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Secretary of State NO:

(SECTION ONE OF TWO) POLTO 3106, April p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT POLTO 3106; REPEATED INFORMATION BONN POLTO 542, LONDON POLTO 826, MOSCOW POLTO 173, BERLIN POLTO 72.

-POUCHED OTHER NATO CAPITALS POLTO UNNUMBERED

Reference: 'POLTO 3099

NAC meeting (private) April 27 -- Four Power Working Group REPORT to NAC

Following supplements report in reference telegram.

Belgium opened two and a half hour NAC discussion with lengthy statement and series questions. Realized difficulty sterring course between rigid adherence to fundamental principles and flexibility necessary for successful megotiations but asked meaning of phrase "indissoluble package" in introductory section report. Does it mean package to be offered at outset with possibility of detaching certain elements later or will there be insistence package be kept intact throughout negotiations? Asked if certain points, e.g. surprise attack, could not be singled est for negotiation in case Soviets reject deal. Re Berlin, thought it might be possible obtain improvement during negotiations with GDR. This would not mean any recognition GER but merely taking account fact GER exists. Same point involved in establishment mixed committee. Re mixed all-German committee, thought terms reference imprecise which seems dangerous. Suggested mixed committee should evolve constitutional law encompassing an electoral law rather than simply electoral law. Difficulty in talking about electoral

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law based on population was that Soviets would believe West Germany would be in control by virture greater population. Constitutional law might then be submitted to plebiscite. Also feared Russians might prolong committee be ond three years with enlarged scope to operations. Re European security, thought there was danger in being overprecise re zones, yet recognized advantages presenting definite proposals stage 2;

Italy generally pleased with report, particularly indications flexible approach which allows possibility negotiations. Liked concept of stages. Suggested possibility participation in stage 2 of technical experts on controls, surprise attack, etc. had same questions as Belgium re meaning "indisscluble package". Asked Council be given more information re Berlin emergency planning and tactics (see reference telegram).


Greece questioned need statement re non-aggression stage 1, pointing out already in United Nations declaration. Repetition here might give people's false sense security. Public should realize such statement no guarantee against surprise attack.

Spaak then suggested report should be discussed in orderly fashion by chapter. Thought it important Council should know precise meaning word "indissoluble".

(At this point French noted working group report not approved by governments and difficult for four permament representatives reply to questions before Ministers meeting). Does it apply only to German unification or to unification and European security together? Is Peace Treaty also linked? Feared Soviets would not accept any plan if German reunification a prerequisite.

United Kingdom recalled that difficulty of being precise about successive stages negotiation had already been discussed with NAC Pointed out working group proposals not too far from Orthodox position and based on free elections because this is firm Western position and Soviets agreed to it in 1955. Degress indissolubility package mainly question

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question tactics for four Foreign Ministers who hoped for NAC views.

Datch thought that on question indissolubility there are two problems: (1) What we say among ourselves; and (2) what we say to Soviets. He then read comments re paragraph 2 of working group report contained in Dutch statement (being sent addressees POLTO G-987 to Washington) which approved "indissoluble package" concept and stressed necessity prior NAC consultation if any item extracted, for separate consideration.

Benmark, supported by Norway and Canada, concerned at concept package deal. Agreed proposal should be so presented but it should not be decided beforehand that no part could be extracted if this seemed advantageous to West. Canada thought package deals would not work, too complicated for popular understanding and phased over too long a time.

Germany, after noting working group report not yet approved by Chancellor, noted important present proposals as "indissoluble package" to prevent Soviets thinking they could pick up points upon which they wished negotiate.

Norway wanted make clear it favored presenting coherent strong position and did not want to close door to possibility later extracting parts of plan for separate discussion.

Speak again stated his fear that since Soviets will never accept concept free elections and would therefore turn down package plan there would then be no discussion of European security. Noted working group had provided for exception in case of Berlin and hoped Ministers would tell NAC how they interpret word "indissoluble".


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SPAAK THEN TURNED TO IDEA MIXED COMMITTEE. DID NOT FOLLOW SUBTLETIES BELGIAN DEFINITION POSITION PREVIOUSLY STATED AND THOUGHT FORMATION MIXED COMMITTEE DANGEROUS STEP TOWARD RECOGNITION GDR. FEARED SOVIETS WOULD SEIZE ON THIS POINT AS CONSTITUTING SUCH RECOGNITION OF GDR WHICH IS ONE OF PRINCIPAL RUSSIAN OBJECTIVES.

UNITED KINGDOM SAID WORKING GROUP RECOGNIZED DANGERS BUT WERE ATTEMPTING ELABORATE EDEN PLAN WITH THIS DEVICE AND THAT OF POSTPONING FREE ELECTIONS. NOTED THAT IN UNITED KINGDOM VIEW DANGERS LESSENED BY FACT WEST GERMANY MUCH STRONGER THAN EAST GERMANY.

SPAAK THEN SAID SOME OF THE DANGERS WOULD BE DIMINISHED IF IT WAS MIXED INTERNATIONAL RATHER THAN PURELY GERMAN COMMITTEE. CANADA FELT STRONGLY MIXED COMMITTEE IDEA SHOULD BE RETAINED.

UNITED STATES THEN SAID IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER MIXED COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN SECOND STAGE AFTER ENDORSEMENT OF REUNIFICATION IN FIRST STAGE. IMPORTANT TO MAKE CLEAR SOVIETS CANNOT PULL PARTS OUT OF PACKAGE AT WILL. BE EMPHASIZED THESE MATTERS NOT ARTIFICIALLY JOINED BUT FOUNDED ON BASIC ELEMENTS OF SITUATION. WEST SHOULD PROPOSE A

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PRACTICE PLAN OF WHAT COULD BE WORKED OUT AS ONE COHERENT WHOLE.

DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT SECTION OF REPORT. NORWAY ASKED WHAT HAPPENS IN STAGE 2 WHICH SEEMED ONLY A STAGE OF DISCUSSION. THOUGHT WEST SHOULD NOT BE TOO HESITANT TO PROPOSE SPECIFIC ACTIONS IN THIS STAGE.

BELGIUM AGREED REPORT VAGUE AS TO DETAILS BUT POINTED OUT STAGE 2 WAS ONE OF REACHING AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD BE BINDING ONLY AFTER REUNIFICATION.

DUTCH AGAIN ALLUDED TO COMMENTS IN DUTCH STATEMENT ON PARAGRAPHS 12, 13 AND 14 OF REPORT. WAS CONCERNED THAT NO POSITION RE SIZE OF AREA OF LIMITATION OF FORCES OR MEASURES AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK BE TAKEN WITHOUT FULL NAC CONSULTATION.

SPAAK THEN COMMENTED THAT DISCUSSION HAD REVEALED THAT WORKING GROUP CONCEIVED OF REUNIFICATION MEASURES AND STEPS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AS BEING INDISSOLUBLE. THIS CLARIFIED MEANING OF PHRASE IN INTRODUCTION TO REPORT.

GERMANY THEN MADE STATEMENT RE ZONE OF INSPECTION AND ARMS LIMITATION NOTED REFTEL. SPAAK, NORWAY AND UNITED KINGDOM MADE COMMENTS ALSO NOTED REFTEL. CANADA EXPRESSED CONCERN AT GERMAN STATEMENT AND PROMISED TO CIRCULATE FURTHER COMMENTS LATER.


B. ITALY ALSO WAS CONCERNED AT GERMAN STATEMENT.

IF IT MEANT GERMANY AGAINST ALL INSPECTION MEASURES AS PROMOTING SPYING THIS WAS VERY SERIOUS POSITION.

DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO PEACE TREATY SECTION REPORT. SPAAK THOUGHT SECTION VERY VAGUE, ASKED WHAT IT MEANT AND WHAT WAS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROPOSING TEXT OF TREATY AND SIMPLY PRINCIPLES.

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UNITED KINGDOM THOUGHT THESE WOULD BE SORT OF POINTS COVERED IN TREATIES HERETOFORE, SUCH AS GUARANTEE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF GERMANY TO CHOOSE ALLIANCES. THOUGHT GENERAL IDEA BEHIND WORKING GROUP PROPOSALS WAS TO HAVE SOMETHING ON HAND TO PRODUCE SINCE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY INSIST ON TALKING ABOUT THE PEACE TREATY. MIGHT BE BETTER FOR WEST HAVE ADVANCE ON PROPOSALS RATHER THAN SIMPLY SIT AND LISTEN.

THERE FOLLOWED GENERAL DISCUSSION WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS FAVORING IDEA ADVANCING PRINCIPLES PEACE TREATY AND SPAAK MAKING HIS FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS AGAINST DOING SO.

SECTIONS OF REPORT ON BERLIN AND TACTICS PASSED OVER WITHOUT DISCUSSION.

SPAAK THEN SUGGESTED THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER NAC DISCUSSION ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR KEEPING NAC INFORMED DURING FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS. UNITED KINGDOM RECALLED PROPOSALS MADE IN WASHINGTON FOR REPORT TO NAC BY MINISTERS AND FELT SURE MINISTERS WOULD DISCUSS QUESTION KEEPING NAC INFORMED DURING NEGOTIATIONS.

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